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The Shadow Economy and Shadow Economy Labor Force: 
What Do We (Not) Know? 
 
In this paper the main focus lies on the development and the size of the shadow economy 
and of undeclared work (or shadow economy labor force) in OECD, developing and transition 
countries. Besides informal employment in the rural and non-rural sector also other measures 
of informal employment like the share of employees not covered by social security, own 
account workers or unpaid family workers are shown. The most influential factors on the 
shadow economy and/or shadow labor force are tax policies and state regulation, which, if 
they rise, increase both. Furthermore the discussion of the recent literature underlines that 
economic opportunities, the overall situation on the labor market, and unemployment are 
crucial for an understanding of the dynamics of the shadow economy and especially the 
shadow labor force. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Fighting tax evasion and the shadow economy have been an important policy goals in OECD 
countries during recent decades. In order to do this one should have knowledge about the size 
and development of the shadow economy and shadow economy labor force as well as the 
reasons why people are engaged in shadow economy activities. Hence, in this paper I am 
mainly concerned with the size and development of the shadow economy, black activities and 
undeclared work. Tax evasion is not considered in order to keep the subject of this paper 
tractable and because too many additional aspects would be involved
1. Also tax morale or 
experimental studies on tax compliance are beyond the scope of this paper
2.  
My paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents theoretical considerations about the 
definition and measurement of the shadow economy and discusses also the main factors 
determining its size. In Section 3 the empirical results of the size and development of the 
shadow economy are discussed. In section 4 a detailed discussion of the size and development 
of the shadow economy labor force and its various aspects are presented. In section 5 the 
interaction between the shadow economy and unemployment is analyzed. In section 6 the 
adjustments of shadow economy measures in national accounts are presented. Finally section 
7 concludes.  
2.  SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE 
SHADOW ECONOMY 
 
2.1.  Defining the Shadow Economy 
Most authors trying to measure the shadow economy still face the difficulty of a precise 
definition of the shadow economy.
3 According to one commonly used definition it comprises 
all currently unregistered economic activities that contribute to the officially calculated  Gross 
                                                 
1.   See Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) for the authoritative survey, Feld and Frey (2007) or Kirchler 
(2007) for broader interdisciplinary approaches, or the papers by Kirchler, Maciejovsky and Schneider 
(2003), Kastlunger, Kirchler, Mittore and Pitters (2009), Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2007). 
2.   The authoritative scientific work on tax morale is by Torgler (2007). See also Torgler (2002) for a survey 
on experimental studies and Blackwell (2009) for a meta-analysis.   
3.   Our paper focuses on the size and development of the shadow economy for uniform countries and not for 
specific regions. Recently first studies have been undertaken to measure the size of the shadow economy 
as well as the “grey” or “shadow” labor force for urban regions or states (e.g. California). See e.g. 
Marcelli, Pastor and Joassart (1999), Marcelli (2004), Chen (2004), Williams and Windebank (1998, 
2001a, b), Flaming, Hayolamak, and Jossart (2005), Alderslade, Talmage and Freeman (2006), Brück, 
Haisten-DeNew and Zimmermann (2006). Herwartz, Schneider and Tafenau (2009) and Tafenau, 
Herwartz and Schneider (2010) estimate the size of the shadow economy of 234 EU-NUTS regions for the 
year 2004 for the first time demonstrating a considerable regional variation in the size of the shadow 
economy.    3 
National Product.
4 Smith (1994, p. 18) defines it as “market-based production of goods and 
services, whether legal or illegal, that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP”. Put 
differently, one of the broadest definitions is: “…those economic activities and the income 
derived from them that circumvent or otherwise avoid government regulation, taxation or 
observation”.
5 As these definitions still leave room for interpretation, Table 2.1 provides a 
further understanding as to what could be a reasonable consensus definition of the 
underground (or shadow) economy. 
 
Table 2.1: A Taxonomy of Types of Underground Economic Activities
1) 





Trade with stolen goods; drug dealing 
and manufacturing; prostitution; 
gambling; smuggling; fraud, human-, 
drug-, and weapon-trafficking   
 
Barter of drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling etc. Produce or growing 


















and assets from 
unreported work 












1) Structure of the table is taken from Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5) with additional remarks. 
From  Table 2.1, it is obvious that a broad definition of the shadow economy includes 
unreported income from the production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or 
barter transactions – and so includes all productive economic activities that would generally 
be taxable were they reported to the state (tax) authorities. 
In this paper the following more narrow definition of the shadow economy is used.
6 The 
shadow economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services that are 
deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons:  
                                                 
4.   This definition is used, e.g., by Feige (1989, 1994), Schneider (1994a, 2003, 2005) and Frey and Pomme-
rehne (1984). Do-it-yourself activities are not included. For estimates of the shadow economy and the do-
it-yourself activities for Germany see Bühn, Karmann und Schneider (2009) or Karmann (1986, 1990). 
5.   This definition is taken from Del’Anno (2003), Del’Anno and Schneider (2004) and Feige (1989); see 
also Thomas (1999), Fleming, Roman and Farrell (2000) or Feld and Larsen (2005, p. 25). 
6.   See also the excellent discussion of the definition of the shadow economy in Pedersen (2003, pp.13-19) 
and Kazemier (2005a) who use a similar one.    4 
1.  to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, 
2.  to avoid payment of social security contributions, 
3.  to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and 
4.  to avoid complying with certain administrative obligations, such as completing 
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
Thus, I will not deal with typically illegal underground economic activities that fit the 
characteristics of classical crimes like burglary, robbery, drug dealing, etc. I also exclude the 
informal household economy which consists of all household services and production.  
 
2.2.  Measuring the Shadow Economy 
The definition of the shadow economy plays an important role in assessing its size. By having 
a clear definition, a number of ambiguities and controversies can be avoided. In general, there 
are two types of underground economic activities: illicit employment and the production of 
goods and services mostly consumed within the household.
7 The following analysis focuses 
on the former type and excludes illegal activities such as drug production, crime and human 
trafficking. The latter type includes the production of goods and services, consumed within 
the household, or childcare and is not part of this analysis either. Thus, it only focuses on 
productive economic activities that would normally be included in the national accounts but 
which remain underground due to tax or regulatory burdens.
8 Although such legal activities 
contribute to the country’s value added, they are not captured in the national accounts because 
they are produced in illicit ways (e.g. by people without proper qualification or without a 
master craftsman’s certificate)
9. From the economic and social perspective, soft forms of 
illicit employment, such as moonlighting (e.g. construction work in private homes) and its 
contribution to aggregate value added can be assessed rather positively. 
                                                 
7.   For a broader discussion of the definition issue see Thomas (1992), Schneider, Volkert and Caspar (2002), 
Schneider and Enste (2002, 2006) and Kazemier (2005a, b). 
8.   With this definition the problem of having classical crime activities included could be avoided, because 
neither the MIMIC procedure nor the currency demand approach captures these activities: e.g. drug 
dealing is independent of increasing taxes, especially as the included causal variables are not linked (or 
causal) to classical crime activities. See e.g. Thomas (1992), Kazemir (2005a, b) and Schneider (2005). 
9        However, compare chapter 6, where it is shown, that shadow economy activities are partly captured in the 
          official statistics in some countries.    5 
Although the issue of the shadow economy has been investigated for a long time, the 
discussion regarding the “appropriate” methodology to assess its scope has not come to an 
end yet.
10 There are three methods of assessment: 
(1) Direct procedures at a micro level that aim at determining the size of the shadow 
economy at one particular point in time. An example is the survey method; 
(2) Indirect procedures that make use of macroeconomic indicators in order to proxy the 
development of the shadow economy over time; 
(3) Statistical models that use statistical tools to estimate the shadow economy as an 
“unobserved” variable. 
My estimation of the shadow economy of highly developed OECD is firstly based on a 
combination of the MIMIC procedure and secondly on the currency demand method; hence a 
combination of these methods.
11 The MIMIC procedure assumes that the shadow economy 
remains an unobserved phenomenon (latent variable) which can be estimated using 
quantitatively measurable causes of illicit employment, e.g. tax burden and regulation 
intensity, and indicators reflecting illicit activities, e.g. currency demand, official GDP and 
official working time. A disadvantage of the MIMIC procedure is the fact, that it produces 
only relative estimates of the size and the development of the shadow economy. Thus, the 
currency demand method
12 is used to calibrate the relative into absolute estimates by using 
two or three absolute values of the absolute size of the shadow economy. 
In addition, the size of the shadow economy is estimated by using survey methods (Feld and 
Larsen (2005, 2008, 2009)). In order to minimize the number of respondents dishonestly 
replying or totally declining answers to the sensitive questions, structured interviews are 
undertaken (usually face-to-face) in which the respondents are slowly getting accustomed to 
the main purpose of the survey. Like it is done by the contingent valuation method (CVM) in 
                                                 
10.   For the strengths and weaknesses of the various methods see Bhattacharyya (1999), Breusch (2005a, b), 
Dell’Anno and Schneider (2009), Dixon (1999), Feige (1989), Feld and Larsen (2005), Feld and 
Schneider (2010), Giles (1999a, b, c), Schneider (1986, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006), Schneider and Enste 
(2000a, b, 2002, 2006), Tanzi (1999), Thomas (1992, 1999).  
11.   These methods are presented in detail in Schneider (1994a, b, c, 2005), Feld and Schneider (2010) and 
Schneider and Enste (2000b, 2002, 2006). Furthermore, these studies discuss advantages and 
disadvantages of the MIMIC- and the money demand methods as well as other estimation methods for 
assessing the size of illicit employment; for a detailed discussion see also Feld and Larsen (2005). 
12.   This indirect approach is based on the assumption that cash is used to make transactions within the 
shadow economy. By using this method one econometrically estimates a currency demand function 
including independent variables like tax burden, regulation etc. which “drive” the shadow economy. This 
equation is used to make simulations of the amount of money that would be necessary to generate the 
official GDP. This amount is then compared with the actual money demand and the difference is treated 
as an indicator for the development of the shadow economy. On this basis the calculated difference is 
multiplied by the velocity of money of the official economy and one gets a value added figure for the 
shadow economy. See footnote 10 for references discussing critically this method.    6 
environmental economics (Kopp et al. 1997), a first part of the questionnaire aims at shaping 
respondents’ perception as to the issue at hand. In a second part, questions about respondents’ 
activities in the shadow economy are asked, and the third part contains the usual socio-
demographic questions.  
In addition to the studies by Merz and Wolff (1993), Feld and Larsen (2005, 2008, 2009), 
Haigner et al. (2011) and Enste and Schneider (2006) for Germany, the survey method has 
been applied in the Nordic countries and Great Britain (Isachsen and Strøm 1985, Pedersen 
2003) as well as in the Netherlands (van Eck and Kazemier 1988, Kazemier 2006). While the 
questionnaires underlying these studies are broadly comparable in design, recent attempts by 
the European Union to provide survey results for all EU member states runs into difficulties 
regarding comparability (Renooy et al. 2004, European Commission 2007): the wording of 
the questionnaires becomes more and more cumbersome depending on the culture of different 
countries with respect to the underground economy.  
These two sets of approaches are most broadly used in the literature. Although each has its 
drawbacks, and although biases in the estimates of the shadow economy almost certainly 
prevail, no better data are currently available. In tax compliance research, the most interesting 
data stem from actual tax audits by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In the Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), actual compliance behavior of taxpayers is 
observed and is used for empirical analysis (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998). The 
approach of the IRS is broader in a certain sense as tax evasion from all sources of income is 
considered, while the two methods discussed before aim at capturing the shadow economy or 
undeclared work and thus mainly measure tax evasion from labor income. Even the data 
obtained from the TCMP is biased however because the actually detected tax non-compliance 
could only be the tip of the iceberg. Although the perfect data on tax non-compliance does 
therefore not exist, the imperfect data in this area can still provide interesting insights also 
regarding the size, the development and the determinants of the shadow economy and of the 
shadow economy labor force.  
 
2.3.  The Main Causes Determining the Shadow Economy 
A useful starting point for a theoretical discussion of tax non-compliance is the paper by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) on income tax evasion. While the shadow economy and tax 
evasion are not congruent, activities in the shadow economy in most cases imply the evasion 
of direct or indirect taxes, such that the factors affecting tax evasion will most certainly also    7 
affect the shadow economy. According to Allingham and Sandmo tax compliance depends on 
its expected costs and benefits. The benefits of tax non-compliance result from the individual 
marginal tax rate and the true individual income. In the case of the shadow economy the 
individual marginal tax rate is obtained by calculating the overall marginal tax burden from 
indirect and direct taxes including social security contributions. The individual income 
generated in the shadow economy is usually categorized as labor income and less probably as 
capital income. The expected costs of non-compliance derive from deterrence enacted by the 
state. Tax non-compliance thus depends on the state’s auditing activities raising the 
probability of detection and the fines individuals face when they are caught. As individual 
morality also plays a role for compliance, additional costs could pertain beyond pure 
punishment by the tax administration in the form of psychic costs like shame or regret, but 
also additional pecuniary costs if, e.g., reputation loss results. 
Kanniainen, Pääkönen and Schneider (2004) incorporate many of these insights in their model 
of the shadow economy by also considering labor supply decisions. They hypothesize that tax 
hikes unambiguously increase the shadow economy, while the effect of public goods financed 
by those taxes depends on the ability to access public goods. Morality is also included in this 
analysis. But the costs for individual non-compliers resulting from moral norms appear to be 
mainly captured by state punishment although self-esteem also plays a role. 
A shortcoming of these analyses is the neglected endogeneity of tax morale and good 
governance. In contrast, Feld and Frey (2007) argue that tax compliance is the result of a 
complicated interaction between tax morale and deterrence measures. While it must be clear 
to taxpayers what the rules of the game are and as deterrence measures serve as signals for the 
tax morale a society wants to elicit (Posner 2000a, b), deterrence could also crowd out the 
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. Moreover, tax morale is not only increased if taxpayers 
perceive the public goods received in exchange for their tax payments worth it. It also 
increases if political decisions for public activities are perceived to follow fair procedures or if 
the treatment of taxpayers by the tax authorities is perceived to be friendly and fair. Tax 
morale is thus not exogenously given, but is influenced by deterrence, the quality of state 
institutions and the constitutional differences among states. 
Although this leaves me with a rich set of variables that might influence the size of the 
shadow economy, it is only the starting point. As labor supply decisions are involved, labor 
and product market regulations are additionally important. Recent theoretical approaches thus 
suggest following a differentiated policy to contain the shadow economy’s expansion.    8 
2.3.1  Deterrence
13 
Although the traditional economic theory of tax non-compliance derives unambiguous 
predictions as to their impact only for deterrence measures and despite the strong focus on 
deterrence in policies fighting the shadow economy, there is surprisingly little known about 
the effects of deterrence from empirical studies. In their survey on tax compliance, Andreoni, 
Erard and Feinstein (1998) report that deterrence matters for tax evasion, but that the reported 
effects are rather small. Blackwell (2009) finds strong deterrence effects of fines and audits in 
experimental tax evasion. Regarding the shadow economy, there is however little evidence.  
This is due to the fact that data on the legal background and the frequency of audits are not 
available on an international basis. They would also be difficult to collect even for the OECD 
member countries. A recent study by Feld, Schmidt and Schneider (2007) demonstrates this 
for the case of Germany. The legal background is quite complicated differentiating fines and 
punishment according to the severity of the offense, to true income of the non-complier, but 
also regionally given different directives on sentences by the courts in different Länder. 
Moreover, the tax authorities at the state level do not reveal how intensively auditing is taking 
place. With the available data on fines and audits, Feld, Schmidt and Schneider (2007) 
conduct a time series analysis using the estimates of the shadow economy obtained by the 
MIMIC approach. According to their results, deterrence does not have a consistent effect on 
the German shadow economy. Conducting Granger causality tests, the direction of causation 
(in the sense of precedence) is ambiguous leaving room for an impact of the shadow economy 
on deterrence instead of deterrence on the shadow economy. 
Feld and Larsen (2005, 2008, 2009) follow a different approach by using individual survey 
data for Germany. First replicating Pedersen (2003), who reports a negative impact of the 
subjectively perceived risk of detection by state audits on the probability of working in the 
shadows for the year 2001, they then extend it by adding subjectively perceived measures of 
fines and punishment. Fines and punishment do not exert a negative influence on the shadow 
economy in any of the annual waves of surveys, nor in the pooled regressions for the years 
2004-2007 (about 8000 observations overall). The subjectively perceived risk of detection has 
a robust and significant negative impact in individual years only for women. In the pooled 
sample for 2004-2007, which minimizes sampling problems, the probability of detection has a 
                                                 
13 This part is taken from Feld and Schneider (2010, pp. 115-116)    9 
significantly negative effect on the probability of working in the shadow economy also for 
men (keeping the one for women) and is robust across different specifications.
14  
Pedersen (2003) reports negative effects of the subjectively perceived risk of detection on the 
probability of conducting undeclared work in the shadows for men in Denmark in 2001 
(marginally significant), for men in Norway in 1998/2002 (highly significant),
15 men and 
women in Sweden in 1998 (highly significant in the first and marginally significant in the 
second case), and no significant effect for Great Britain in 2000. Moreover, van Eck and 
Kazemier (1988) report a significant negative of a high perceived probability of detection on 
participation in the hidden labor market for the Netherlands in 1982/1983. In none of these 
studies perceived fines and punishments are included as explanatory variables. The large scale 
survey study on Germany by Feld and Larsen (2005, 2009) thus appears to be the most careful 
analysis of deterrence effects on undeclared work up to date. 
Overall, this is far from convincing evidence on the proper working of deterrence as it is 
always the combination of audits and fines that matters according to theoretical analysis, but 
also to pure plausibility arguments. The reasons for the unconvincing evidence of deterrence 
effects are discussed in the tax compliance literature by Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998), 
Kirchler (2007) or Feld and Frey (2007). They range from interactions between tax morale 
and deterrence, thus the possibility that deterrence crowds out tax morale, to more mundane 
arguments like misperceptions of taxpayers. Likewise, these reasons could be important for 
the evidence on the deterrence effects on work in the shadow economy. As the latter mainly 
stems from survey studies, the insignificant findings for fines and punishment may also result 
from shortcomings in the survey design.  
2.3.2  Tax and Social Security Contribution Burdens 
In contrast to deterrence, almost all studies ascertain that the tax and social security 
contribution burdens are among the main causes for the existence of the shadow economy.
16 
Since taxes affect labor-leisure choices and stimulate labor supply in the shadow economy, 
the distortion of the overall tax burden is a major concern. The bigger the difference between 
the total labor cost in the official economy and after-tax earnings (from work), the greater is 
the incentive to reduce the tax wedge and work in the shadow economy. Since the tax wedge 
                                                 
14.   An earlier study by Merz and Wolff (1993) does not analyze the impact of deterrence on undeclared work.  
15.   The earlier study by Isachsen and Strøm (1985) for Norway does also not properly analyze the impact of 
deterrence on undeclared work.  
16.   See Thomas (1992), Lippert and Walker (1997), Schneider (1994a, b, c, 1997, 1998a, b, 1999, 2000, 
2003, 2005, 2009), Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a, b), Tanzi (1999), Giles (1999a), 
Mummert and Schneider (2001), Giles and Tedds (2002) and Dell’Anno (2003) as more recent ones.    10 
depends on the level and increase of the social security burden/payments and the overall tax 
burden, they are key features of the existence and the increase of the shadow economy.  
2.3.3  Intensity of Regulations 
Increased intensity of regulations, for example labor market regulations, trade barriers, and 
labor restrictions for immigrants. is another important factor which reduces the freedom (of 
choice) for individuals engaged in the official economy. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-
Lobatón (1998b) find significant empirical evidence of the influence of (labor) regulations on 
the shadow economy; and the impact is clearly described and theoretically derived in other 
studies, e.g. for Germany (Deregulierungskommission/ Deregulation Commission 1991).
17 
Regulations lead to a substantial increase in labor costs in the official economy. But since 
most of these costs can be shifted to employees, regulations provide for another incentive to 
work in the shadow economy where they can be avoided. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer 
(1997) report empirical evidence supporting their model which predicts that countries with 
higher general regulation of their economies tend to have a higher share of the unofficial 
economy in total GDP. They conclude that it is the enforcement of regulation which is the key 
factor for the burden levied on firms and individuals, and not the overall extent of regulation – 
mostly not enforced – which drives firms into the shadow economy. Friedman, Johnson, 
Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2000) arrive at a similar conclusion. In their study every 
available measure of regulation is significantly correlated with the share of the unofficial 
economy and the estimated sign of the relationship is unambiguous: more regulation is 
correlated with a larger shadow economy. 
2.3.4  Public Sector Services 
An increase of the shadow economy can lead to reduced state revenues which in turn reduce 
the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services. Ultimately, this can lead to 
an increase in the tax rates for firms and individuals in the official sector, quite often 
combined with a deterioration in the quality of the public goods (such as the public 
infrastructure) and of the administration, with the consequence of even stronger incentives to 
participate in the shadow economy. Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a, b) 
present a simple model of this relationship. According to their findings smaller shadow 
economies occur in countries with higher tax revenues achieved by lower tax rates, fewer 
laws and regulations and less bribery facing enterprises. Countries with a better rule of law, 
which is financed by tax revenues, also have smaller shadow economies. Transition countries 
                                                 
17.  The importance of regulation on the official and unofficial (shadow) economy is more recently 
investigated by Loayza, Oviedo and Servén (2005a, b). Kucera and Roncolato (2008) extensively analyze 
the impact of labor market regulation on the shadow economy.    11 
have higher levels of regulation leading to a significantly higher incidence of bribery, higher 
effective taxes on official activities and a large discretionary framework of regulations and 
consequently a higher shadow economy. Their overall conclusion is that “wealthier countries 
of the OECD, as well as some in Eastern Europe, find themselves in the ‘good equilibrium’ of 
relatively low tax and regulatory burden, sizeable revenue mobilization, good rule of law and 
corruption control, and a [relatively] small unofficial economy. By contrast, a number of 
countries in Latin American and the former Soviet Union exhibit characteristics consistent 
with a ‘bad equilibrium’: tax and regulatory discretion and burden on the firm is high, the rule 
of law is weak, and there is a high incidence of bribery and a relatively high share of activities 
in the unofficial economy.” (Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón 1998a, p. I).  
2.3.5  Other Public Institutions 
Recently, various authors
18 consider quality of public institutions as another key factor of the 
development of the informal sector. They argue that the efficient and discretionary application 
of tax systems and regulations by government may play a crucial role in the decision of 
conducting undeclared work, even more important than the actual burden of taxes and 
regulations. In particular, corruption of bureaucracy and government officials seems to be 
associated with larger unofficial activity, while a good rule of law by securing property rights 
and contract enforceability, increases the benefits of being formal.  
Hence, it is important to analyze theoretically and empirically the effect of political 
institutions like the federal political system on the shadow economy. If the development of the 
informal sector is considered as a consequence of the failure of political institutions in 
promoting an efficient market economy, since entrepreneurs go underground when there is an 
inefficient public goods provision, then the effect of institutions of the individual’s incentive 
to operate unofficially can be assessed. In a federal system, competition among jurisdictions 
and the mobility of individuals act as constraints on politicians because “choices” will be 
induced that provide incentives to adopt policies which are closer to a majority of voters’ 
preferences. Frequently, the efficient policies are characterized by a certain level of taxation, 
mostly spent in productive public services. In fact, the production in the formal sector benefits 
from a higher provision of the productive public services and is negatively affected by 
taxation, while the shadow economy reacts in the opposite way. As fiscal policy gets closer to 
a majority of voters’ preferences in federal systems, the size of the informal sector goes down. 
                                                 
18 See e.g. Johnson et al. (1998a, b), Friedman et al. (2000), Dreher and Schneider (2009), Dreher, Kotsogiannis 
and Macorriston (2007, 2009), as well as Teobaldelli (2011), Schneider (2010) and Buehn and Schneider (2010).    12 
This leads to the hypothesis that the size of the shadow economy should be lower in a federal 
system than in a unitary state, ceteris paribus. 
2.3.6  Tax Morale 
In addition to the incentives effects discussed before, the efficiency of the public sector has an 
indirect effect on the size of the shadow economy because it affects tax morale. As Feld and 
Frey (2007) argue, tax compliance is driven by a psychological tax contract that entails rights 
and obligations from taxpayers and citizens on the one hand, but also from the state and its tax 
authorities on the other hand. Taxpayers are more heavily inclined to pay their taxes honestly 
if they get valuable public services in exchange. However, taxpayers are honest even in cases 
when the benefit principle of taxation does not hold, i.e. for redistributive policies, if the 
political decisions underlying such policies follow fair procedures. Finally, the treatment of 
taxpayers by the tax authority plays a role. If taxpayers are treated like partners in a (tax) 
contract instead of subordinates in a hierarchical relationship, taxpayers will stick to their 
obligations of the psychological tax contract more easily. In addition to the empirical 
evidence on these arguments reported by Feld and Frey (2007), and by Kirchler (2007) 
present a comprehensive discussion of the influence of such factors on tax compliance.  
Regarding the impact of tax morale on the shadow economy, there is scarce and only recent 
evidence. Using data on the shadow economy obtained by the MIMIC approach, Torgler and 
Schneider (2009) report the most convincing evidence for a negative effect of tax morale. 
They particularly address causality issues and establish a causal negative relation from tax 
morale to the size of the shadow economy. This effect is also robust to the inclusion of 
additional explanatory factors and specifications. These findings are also in line with earlier 
preliminary evidence by Körner et al. (2006). Using survey data, Feld and Larsen (2005, 
2009) likewise report a robust negative effect of tax morale in particular and social norms in 
general on the probability of respondents to conduct undeclared work. Interestingly, the 
estimated effects of social norms are quantitatively more important than the estimated 
deterrence effects. Van Eck and Kazemier (1988) also report a marginally significant effect of 
tax morale on the participation in the hidden labor market.  
2.3.7  Summary of the Main Causes of the Shadow Economy 
In Table 2.2 an overview of a number of empirical studies summarizes the various factors 
influencing the shadow economy. The overview is based on the studies in which the size of 
the shadow economy is measured by the MIMIC or currency demand approach. As there is no 
evidence on deterrence using these approaches – at least with respect to the broad panel data 
base on which this table draws – the most central policy variable does not show up. This is an    13 
obvious shortcoming of the studies, but one that cannot be coped with easily due to the lack of 
internationally comparable deterrence data. In Table 2.2 two columns are presented, showing 
the various factors influencing the shadow economy with and without the independent 
variable, “tax morale”. This table clearly demonstrates that the increase of tax and social 
security contribution burdens is by far most important single contributor to the increase of the 
shadow economy. This factor does explain some 35–38% or 45–52% of the variance of the 
shadow economy with and without including the variable “tax morale”. The variable tax 
morale accounts for some 22–25% of the variance of the shadow economy,
19 there is a third 
factor, “quality of state institutions”, accounting for 10-12% and a forth factor, “intensity of 
state regulation“ (mostly for the labor market) for 7-9%. In general Table 2.2 shows that the 
independent variables tax and social security burden, followed by variables tax morale and 
intensity of state regulations are the three major driving forces of the shadow economy. 
 
Table 2.2: Main Causes of the Increase of the Shadow Economy 
Influence on the shadow economy (in %)  Factors influencing the shadow economy 
(a) (b) 
(1)  Increase of the Tax and Social Security 
Contribution Burdens 
35-38 45-52 
(2)  Quality of State Institutions   10-12  12-17 
(3)  Transfers 5-7  7-9 
(4)  Specific Labor Market Regulations  7-9  7-9 
(5)  Public Sector Services  5-7  7-9 
(6)  Tax Morale  22-25  - 
Influence of all Factors  84-98  78-96 
(a) Average values of 12 studies. 
(b) Average values of empirical results of 22 studies. 
Source: Schneider (2009) 
                                                 
19.   The importance of this variable with respect to theory and empirical relevance is also shown in Frey 
(1997), Feld and Frey (2002a, 2002b, 2007) and Torgler and Schneider (2009).    14 
3.  ESTIMATION AND SIZE OF THE SHADOW ECONOMIES IN 
HIGHLY DEVELOPED OECD COUNTRIES 
3.1.  Econometric Estimation  
Following the theoretical considerations in section 2, I develop seven hypotheses below (all 
ceteris paribus), which will be empirically tested subsequently using the MIMIC approach: 
1.  An increase in direct and indirect taxation increases the shadow economy. 
2.  An increase in social security contributions increases the shadow economy. 
3.  The more the country is regulated, the greater the incentives are to work in the shadow 
economy. 
4.  The lower the quality of state institutions, the higher the incentives to work in the 
shadow economy. 
5.  The lower tax morale, the higher the incentives to work in the shadow economy. 
6.  The higher unemployment, the more people engage in shadow economy activities. 
7.  The lower GDP per capita in a country, the higher is the incentive to work in the 
shadow economy. 
As the sample consists of 21 highly developed OECD countries between 1990 and 2007 
(pooled cross section time series data), the effect of deterrence cannot be empirically tested. 
As the size of fines and punishment and the probability of detection are only available for one 
or two countries across time. They are not considered here. The following estimation results 
thus rather correspond to the factors reported in Table 2.2 which are gained from an overview 
of existing studies.     15 
 
Table 3.1: MIMIC Estimation of the Shadow Economy of 21 Highly Developed OECD Countries, 
1990/91, 1994/95, 1997/98, 1999/2000, 2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2006/07. 
Cause Variables  Estimated Coefficients 
Share of direct taxation  λ1 = 0.392** 
(in % of GDP)  (3.34) 
  
Share of indirect taxation  λ2 = 0.184(*) 
(in % of GDP)  (1.74) 
  
Share of social security contribution  λ3 = 0.523** 
(in % of GDP)  (3.90) 
  
Burden of state regulation (index of labor market 
regulation, Heritage Foundation, score 1 least 
regular, score 5 most regular) 
λ4 = 0.226(*) 
(2.03) 
  
Quality of state institutions (rule of law, World 
Bank, score -3 worst and +3 best case) 
λ5 = -0.314* 
(-2.70) 
  
Tax morale (WVS and EVS, Index, Scale tax 
cheating always justified =1, never justified =10) 
λ6 = -0.593** 
(-3.76) 
  
Unemployment rate (%)  λ7 = 0.316** 
   (2.40) 
  
GDP per capita (in US-$)  λ8 = -0.106** 
(-3.04) 
Indicator Variables  Estimated Coefficients 
Employment rate  λ 9= -0.613** 
(in % of population 18-64)  (-2.52) 
  
Average working time (per week)  λ10 = -1.00 (Residuum) 
  
Annual growth rate of GDP (adjusted for the mean  λ11 = -0.281** 
of all 22 OECD countries)  (-3.16) 
  
Change of local currency  λ12 = 0.320** 
per capita  (3.80) 
 Test-statistics RMSE
1) = 0.0016* (p-value = 0.912) 
   Chi-square
2) = 26.43 (p-value = 0.916) 
  TMCV
3) = 0.051 
   AGFI
4) = 0.772 
   N = 189 
   D.F.
5) = 71 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses (*); *; ** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, or 99% confidence levels. 
1) Steiger’s Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) for test of close fit; RMSEA < 0.05; the 
RMSEA-value varies between 0.0 and 1.0. 
2)  If the structural equation model is asymptotically correct, then the matrix S (sample covariance matrix) will 
be equal to Σ (θ) (model implied covariance matrix). This test has a statistical validity with a large sample (N 
≥ 100) and multinomial distributions; both are given for all three equations in tables 3.1.1-3.1.3 using a test of 
multinomial distributions. 
3)  Test of Multivariate Normality for Continuous Variables (TMNCV); p-values of skewness and kurtosis. 
4)  Test of Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), varying between 0 and 1; 1 = perfect fit. 
5) The degrees of freedom are determined by 0.5 (p + q) (p + q + 1) – t; with p = number of indicators; q = 
number of causes; t = the number for free parameters.    16 
In Table 3.1 the econometric results using the MIMIC approach (latent estimation approach) 
are presented for these 21 OECD-countries for which I have nine data points of the years 
1990/91, 1994/95, 1997/98, 1999/2000, 2001/02, 2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2006/07. 
Besides the usual cause variables like direct and indirect taxation, social security contributions 
and state regulation I have added two further causal factors, i.e. tax morale and the quality of 
state institutions. In addition to the employment rate, the annual growth rate of GDP and the 
change of currency per capita, I use the average working time (per week) as an additional 
indicator variable.
20 The estimated coefficients of all eight cause variables are statistically 
significant and have the theoretically expected signs. The tax and social security burden 
variables are quantitatively the most important ones, followed by the tax morale variable 
which has the single biggest influence. Also the independent variable quality of state 
institutions is statistically significant and quite important to determine whether one is engaged 
in shadow economy activities or not. The development of the official economy measured by 
unemployment and GDP per capita has a quantitatively important influence on the shadow 
economy. Turning to the indicator variables they all have a statistically significant influence 
and the estimated coefficients have the theoretically expected signs. The quantitatively most 
important independent variables are the employment rate and the change of currency per 
capita.
21 Summarizing, the econometric results demonstrate that in these OECD countries the 
social security contributions and the share of direct taxation have the biggest influence, 
followed by tax morale and the quality of state institutions
22.  
3.2.  The Development and Size of the Shadow Economy in German-Speaking 
Countries 
Existing estimates of the German shadow economy (measured in percentage of official GDP) 
are shown in table 3.2 (see also Feld et.al. 2007). The oldest estimate uses the survey method 
of the Institute for Demoscopy (IfD) in Allensbach, Germany, and shows that the shadow 
economy was 3.6% of official GDP in 1974. In a much later study, Feld and Larsen (2005, 
2008) undertook an extensive research project using the survey method to estimate shadow 
economic activities in the years 2001 to 2006.
23 Using the officially paid wage rate, they 
                                                 
20.   Using this indicator variable the problem might arise that this variable is influenced by state regulation, so 
that it is not exogenous; hence the estimation may be biased, this problem applies for almost all causal 
variables! 
21.   The variable currency per capita or annual change of currency per capita is heavily influenced by banking 
innovations or payment; hence this variable is pretty unstable with respect to the length of the estimation 
period. Similar problems are already mentioned by Giles (1999a) and Giles and Tedds (2002). 
22.  Compare also Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010), and Feld and Schneider (2010). 
23.    In my paper there is no extensive discussion about the various methods to estimate the size and 
development of the shadow economy; I do also not discuss the strength and weaknesses of each method.    17 
concluded that these activities reached 4.1% in 2001, 3.1% in 2004, 3.6% in 2005 and 2.5% in 
2006.
24 Using the (much lower) shadow economy wage rate these estimates shrink however to 
1.3% in 2001 and 1.0% in 2004, respectively. If I consider the discrepancy method, for which 
I have estimates from 1970 to 1980, the German shadow economy is much larger: using the 
discrepancy between expenditure and income, I get approximately 11% for the 1970s, and 
using the discrepancy between official and actual employment, roughly 30%. The physical 
input methods from which estimates for the 1980s are available, “deliver” values of around 
15% for the second half of that decade. The (monetary) transaction approach developed by 
Feige (1989) places the shadow economy at 30% between 1980 and 1985. Yet another 
monetary approach, the currency demand approach – the first person to undertake an 
estimation for Germany was Kirchgässner (1983, 1984) – provides values of 3.1% (1970) and 
10.1% (1980). Kirchgässner’s values are quite similar to the ones obtained by Schneider and 
Enste (2000, 2002), who also used a currency demand approach to value the size of the 
shadow economy at 4.5% in 1970 and 14.7% in 2000. Finally, if I look at latent MIMIC 
estimation procedures, the first ones being conducted by Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984), 
and later, Schneider and others followed for Germany, again, the estimations for the 1970s are 
quite similar. Furthermore, Schneider’s estimates using a MIMIC approach (Schneider 2005, 
2009) are close to those of the currency demand approach.  
Thus, one can see that different estimation procedures produce different results. It is safe to 
say that the figures produced by the transaction and the discrepancy approaches are rather 
unrealistically large: the size of the shadow economy at almost one third of official GDP in 
the mid-1980s is most likely an overestimate. The figures obtained using the currency demand 
and hidden variable (latent) approaches, on the other hand, are relatively close together and 
much lower than those produced by other methods (i.e. the discrepancy or transaction 
approaches). This similarity is not surprising given the fact that the estimates of the shadow 
economy using the latent (MIMIC) approach were measured by taking point estimates from 
the currency demand approach. The estimates from the MIMIC approach can be regarded as 
the upper bound of the size of the shadow economy. For the reasons outlined in Section 2, the 
estimates obtained from the survey approach provide for its lower bound. It should be noted 
that the “true” size of the shadow economy does not necessarily lie between both bounds, nor 
                                                                                                                                                         
See Schneider and Enste (2000), Schneider (2005), Feld and Larsen (2005, 2008, 2009), Pedersen (2003), 
and Giles (1999a, b, c). 
24.   Due to the extraordinarily low rate of participation based on a relatively small sample, the results for 2006 
must be interpreted with extra great care. The results for 2006 should be regarded as tentative and, at the 
most, as an indication that black activities do not appear to have increased from 2005 to 2006.    18 
is it precluded that it is closer to the upper than the lower bound. But both benchmarks help us 
to understand the phenomenon pretty well.  
3.3.  Size and Development of the Shadow Economy in 21 OECD Countries 
In order to calculate the size and development of the shadow economies of the 21 OECD 
countries, I have to overcome the disadvantage of the MIMIC approach, which is, that only 
relative sizes of the shadow economy are obtained such that another approach to calculate 
absolute figures must be used. For the calculation of the absolute sizes of the shadow 
economies from these MIMIC estimation results, I take the already available estimates from 
the currency demand approach for Austria, Germany, Italy and the United States (from studies 
of Dell’Anno and Schneider 2003, Bajada and Schneider 2005, and Schneider and Enste 
2002). As I have values of the shadow economy (in % of GDP) for various years for the 
above mentioned countries, we can use them in a benchmark procedure to transform the index 
of the shadow economy from the MIMIC estimations into cardinal values.
25  
Table 3.3 presents the findings for 21 OECD countries until 2007. They clearly reveal that 
since the end of 90’s the size of the shadow economy in most OECD countries continued to 
decrease. The unweighted average for all countries in 1999/2000 was 16.8% and dropped to 
13.9% in 2007. This means, that since 1997/98 – the year in which the shadow economy was 
the biggest in most OECD countries, it has continuously shrunk. Only in Germany, Austria 
and Switzerland the growing trend lasted longer and was reversed two or three years ago. The 
reduction of the share of the shadow economy from GDP between 1997/98 and 2007 is most 
pronounced in Italy (-5.0%) and in Sweden (-4.0). The German shadow economy ranges in 
the middle of the ranking, whereas Austria and Switzerland are located at the lower end. With 
20% to 26%, South European countries exhibit the biggest shadow economies measured as a 
share from official GDP. They are followed by Scandinavian countries whose shadow 
economies’ shares in GDP range between 15 and 16%. One reason for the differences in the 
size of the shadow economy between these OECD countries includes, among others, that for 
example there are fewer regulations in the OECD country USA compared to the OECD 
country Germany where everything is forbidden, what is not explicitly allowed. The 
individual’s freedom is limited in many areas by far-reaching state interventions. Another 
reason is the large differences in the direct and indirect tax burden with the lowest in the U.S. 
and Switzerland in this sample.  
                                                 
25.   This procedure is described in great detail in the paper Dell’Anno and Schneider (2004, 2009).     19 
Table 3.2: The Size of the Shadow Economy in Germany According to Different Methods (in Percentage of Official GDP)  
Shadow economy in Germany (in percentage of official GDP) in:  Method 
1970 1975  1980  1985  1990 1995 2000  2005 
Source 
- 3.6 
1) -  -  -  -  -  -  IfD  Allensbach  (1975)  Survey 
- -  -  -  - -  4.1 
2) 3.6 
2)  Feld and Larsen (2005, 2008) 
Discrepancy between expenditure and 
income 
11.0 10.2  13.4  -  -  -  -  -  Lippert  and  Walker  (1997) 
Discrepancy between official and 
actual employment 
23.0 38.5  34.0  -  -  -  -  -  Langfeldt  (1984a,  b) 
Physical  input  method  - -  - 14.5  14.6  - -  -  Feld  and  Larsen  (2005) 
Transactions approach  17.2  22.3  29.3  31.4  -  -  -  -   
3.1 6.0 10.3  -  -  -  -  - Kirchgässner  (1983) 
12.1 11.8  12.6  -  -  -  -  -  Langfeldt  (1984a,  b) 
Currency demand approach 
4.5 7.8  9.2  11.3 11.8  12.5  14.7  - Schneider  and  Enste  (2000) 
5.8 6.1  8.2  -  -  -  -  - Frey  and  Weck  (1984) 
-  -  9.4  10.1  11.4  15.1  16.3  -  Pickhardt and Sarda Pons 
(2006) 
Latent (MIMIC) approach 
4.2  5.8  10.8  11.2  12.2  13.9  16.0  15.4  Schneider (2005, 2007) 
Soft modeling  -  8.3 
4) -  -  -  -  -  -  Weck-Hannemann  (1983) 
1) 1974. 
2) 2001 and 2005; calculated using wages in the official economy.    20 
Table 3.3: The Size of the Shadow Economy (in % of Official GDP) in 21 OECD Countries between 1989/90 and 2007  
Estimated Using and MIMIC Method and the Currency Demand Approach to Calibrate the MIMIC values  
  Shadow Economy (in % of official GDP) 
OECD-countries  Average 1989/90  Average 1994/95  Average 1997/98  Average 1999/00  Average 2001/02  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
1. Australia  10.1  13.5  14.0  14.3 14.1  13.7  13.2  12.6  11.4  10.7 
2. Belgium  19.3  21.5  22.5  22.2 22.0  21.4  20.7  20.1  19.2  18.3 
3. Canada  12.8  14.8  16.2  16.0 15.8  15.3  15.1  14.3  13.2  12.6 
4. Denmark  10.8  17.8  18.3  18.0 17.9  17.4  17.1  16.5  15.4  14.8 
5. Germany  11.8  13.5  14.9  16.0  16.3  17.1  16.1  15.4  14.9  14.6 
6. Finland  13.4  18.2  18.9  18.1 18.0  17.6  17.2  16.6  15.3  14.5 
7. France  9.0  14.5  14.9  15.2 15.0  14.7  14.3  13.8  12.4  11.8 
8. Greece  22.6  28.6  29.0  28.7 28.5  28.2  28.1  27.6  26.2  25.1 
9. Great Britain  9.6  12.5  13.0  12.7 12.5  12.2  12.3  12.0  11.1  10.6 
10. Ireland  11.0  15.4  16.2  15.9  15.7 15.4  15.2  14.8  13.4  12.7 
11. Italy  22.8  26.0  27.3  27.1  27.0 26.1  25.2  24.4  23.2  22.3 
12. Japan  8.8  10.6  11.1  11.2  11.1 11.0  10.7  10.3  9.4  9.0 
13. Netherlands  11.9  13.7  13.5  13.1 13.0  12.7  12.5  12.0  10.9  10.1 
14. New Zealand  9.2  11.3  11.9  12.8 12.6  12.3  12.2  11.7  10.4  9.8 
15. Norway  14.8  18.2  19.6  19.1 19.0  18.6  18.2  17.6  16.1  15.4 
16. Austria  6.9  8.6  9.0  9.8  10.6  10.8  11.0  10.3  9.7  9.4 
17. Portugal  15.9  22.1  23.1  22.7 22.5  22.2  21.7  21.2  20.1  19.2 
18. Sweden  15.8  19.5  19.9  19.2 19.1  18.6  18.1  17.5  16.2  15.6 
19. Switzerland  6.7  7.8  8.1  8.6  9.4  9.5  9.4  9.0  8.5  8.2 
20. Spain   16.1  22.4  23.1  22.7 22.5  22.2  21.9  21.3  20.2  19.3 
21. USA  6.7  8.8  8.9  8.7  8.7 8.5  8.4  8.2  7.5  7.2 
Unweighted average for 
21 OECD countries 
12.7 16.2  16.8  16.8  16.7  16.5 16.1  15.6  14.5  13.9 
Source: Own calculations.    21 
4.  SHADOW ECONOMY LABOR FORCE AND LABOR MARKET 
 
4.1.  Shadow Economy Labor Market 
Having examined the size, rise and fall of the shadow economy in terms of value added over 
time, the analysis now focuses on the “shadow labor market”, as within the official labor 
market there is a particularly tight relationship and “social network” between people who are 
active in the shadow economy.
26 Moreover, by definition every activity in the shadow 
economy involves a “shadow labor market” to some extent:
27 Hence, the “shadow labor 
market” includes all cases, where the employees or the employers, or both, occupy a “shadow 
economy position“. 
Why do people work in the shadow economy? In the official labor market, the costs firms 
(and individuals) have to pay when “officially” hiring someone are tremendously increased by 
the burden of tax and social contributions on wages, as well as by the legal administrative 
regulation to control economic activity. In various OECD countries, these costs are greater 
than the wage effectively earned by the worker – providing a strong incentive to work in the 
shadow economy.  
More detailed theoretical information on the labor supply decision in the underground 
economy is given by Lemieux, Fortin and Fréchette (1994) who use micro data from a survey 
conducted in Quebec City (Canada). In particular, their study provides some economic 
insights regarding the size of the distortion caused by income taxation and the welfare system. 
The results of this study suggest that hours worked in the shadow economy are quite 
responsive to changes in the net wage in the regular (official) sector. Their empirical results 
attribute this to a (mis-) allocation of work from the official to the informal sector, where it is 
not taxed. In this case, the substitution between labor market activities in the two sectors is 
quite high. These empirical findings indicate, that “participation rates and hours worked in the 
underground sector also tend to be inversely related to the number of hours worked in the 
regular sector“ (Lemieux, Fortin and Fréchette 1994, p. 235). These findings demonstrate a 
large negative elasticity of hours worked in the shadow economy with respect both to the 
wage rate in the regular sector as well as to a high mobility between the sectors. 
Illicit work can take many forms. The underground use of labor may consist of a second job 
after (or even during) regular working hours. A second form is shadow economy work by 
                                                 
26.  Pioneering work in this area has been done by L. Frey (1972, 1975, 1978, 1980), Cappiello (1986), Lubell 
(1991), Pozo (1996), Bartlett (1998) and Tanzi (1999).    22 
individuals who do not participate in the official labor market. A third component is the 
employment of people (e.g. clandestine or illegal immigrants), who are not allowed to work in 
the official economy. Empirical research on the shadow economy labor market is even more 
difficult than of the shadow economy on the value added, since one has very little knowledge 
about how many hours an average “shadow economy worker” is actually working (from full 
time to a few hours, only); hence, it is not easy to provide empirical facts.
28  
Kucera and Roncolato (2008, p. 321) also deal with informal employment. They address two 
issues of crucial importance to labor market policy: 
(i)  The intensive labor market regulations as one (major) cause of informal 
employment, and 
(ii)  the so-called “voluntary” informal employment. Kucera and Roncolato give a 
theoretical overview on both issues and also a survey of a number of empirical 
studies, in which mainly the effect of official labor market regulations on informal 
employment is analyzed, where they find a significant and quantitatively 
important influence. 
4.2.  Shadow Economy Labor Force 
4.2.1 World Wide Aspects – Latest Results 
The following results of the shadow economy labor force are based on the OECD and World 
Bank database on informal employment in major cities and in rural areas, as well as on other 
sources mentioned in the footnotes of this chapter. The values of the shadow economy labor 
force are calculated in absolute terms, and as a percentage of the official labor force, under the 
assumption that the shadow economy in rural areas is at least as high as in the cities. This is a 
conservative assumption, since in reality it is likely to be even larger.
29 Survey techniques 
and, for some countries, the MIMIC-method and the method of the discrepancy between the 
official and actual labor force are used for estimation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                          
27.   Compare also the latest OECD report with the title “Is Informal Normal: Toward More and Better Jobs” 
by the OECD (2009). 
28.  For developing countries some literature about the shadow labor market exists (Dallago (1990), Pozo 
(1996), Loayza (1996), Chickering and Salahdine (1991) and OECD (2009)). 
29.   The assumption that the shadow economy labour force is at least as high in rural areas as in major cities, 
is a very modest one and is supported by Lubell (1991). Some authors (e.g., Lubell (1991), Pozo (1996), 
and Chickering and Salahdine (1991)) argue that the illicit labour force is nearly twice as high in the 
countryside as in urban areas. But since no (precise) data exists on this ratio, the assumption of an equal 
size may be justified arguing that such a calculation provides at least minimal figures.    23 
One of the latest studies is the OECD (2009) one which provides world wide figures. This 
OECD study (2009)
30 concludes that in many parts of the world and over the period 1990 to 
2007 informal employment is the norm, not the exception,. More than half of all jobs in the 
non-agricultural sectors of developing countries – over 900 million workers – can be 
considered informal. If agricultural workers in developing countries are included, the 
estimates size to roughly 2,000 million people. The share of informal employment is also 
shown in figures 4.1 and 4.2 for Latin America and South East Asia. In some regions, 
including Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, over 80% of non-agricultural jobs are informal. 
Most informal workers in the developing world are self-employed and work independently, or 
owe and manage very small enterprises. According to the OECD study (2009), informal 
employment is a result of both, people being excluded from official jobs and people 
voluntarily opting out of formal structures, e.g. in many middle income countries incentives 
drive individuals and businesses out of the formal sector. 
To summarize, this OECD study clearly comes to the conclusion that informal is really the 
norm or the normal case. 1.8 billion people work in informal jobs, compared to 1.2 billion 
who benefit from formal contracts and social security protection. Informal economic activity, 
excluding the agricultural sector, accounts for three quarters of the jobs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, more than two thirds in South and South East Asia, half in Latin America, the Middle 
East and North Africa, and nearly one quarter in transition countries. If agriculture is 
included, the informal share of the economy in the above mentioned regions is even higher 
(e.g. more than 90 % in South Asia). Also, the OECD study (2009) comes to the result that 
more than 700 million informal workers “survive” on less than $ 1.25 a day and some 1.2 
billion on less than $ 2 a day. The study also concludes that the share of informal employment 
tends to increase during economic turmoil. For example, during the Argentine economic crisis 
(1999-2002), the countries’ “official” economy shrank as by almost one fifth while the share 
of informal employment expanded from 48 to 52 percent. One can clearly see that even under 
strong economic growth, the share of non-agricultural employment and, the share of informal 
employment is strongly rising.  
                                                 
30   The following results and figures are taken from the OECD (2009), executive summary.    24 
Figure 4.1: Informal Employment and GDP in Latin America and Southeast Asia 
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Table 4.1.:  Estimates of the Size of the “Shadow Economy Labor Force” in Some OECD Countries 1974-1998 
Countries  Year 
 
Official GDP 






official GDP per 
capita in US-$) 
Size of the Shadow 
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Schneider (1998a, b) and  
own calculations 
Denmark  1980  13,233  18,658  8.6  250  8.3  Mogensen, et. al.  
 1986  18,496 26,356  9.8  390  13.0  (1995) 
 1991  25,946 36,558  11.2  410  14.3  and  own  calculations 
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-  De Grazia (1983) and own calculations 
1) Source: OECD, Paris, various years 
2) Source: Own calculations from Schneider (2000, 2001). 
3) Estimated full-time jobs, including unregistered workers, illegal immigrants, and second jobs. 
4) In percent of the population aged 20-69, survey method.  
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Table 4.2.: Development of „full time shadow economy workers“ and of illegal foreign workers of 1000 people in Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland over the period 1995 to 2009
1). 
Year  Germany  Austria  Switzerland 












1995  7.320  878  575  75  391  55 
1996  7.636  939  617  83  426  61 
1997  7.899  987  623  86  456  67 
1998  8.240  1.039  634  89  462  69 
1999  8.524  1.074  667  93  484  74 
2000  8.621  1.103  703  99  517  79 
2001  8.909  1.149  734  104  543  84 
2002  9.182  1.194  746  109  556  88 
2003  9.420  1.225  769  112  565  90 
2004  9.023  1.103  789  114  560  89 
2005  8.549  1.002  750  104  520  82 
2006  8.124  952  716  98  493  78 
2007  8.206  961  709  97  490  77 
2008  8.154  955  679  93  471  74 
2009  8.272  968  713  98  484  76 
Source: Own calculations (2010). 
1)   Explanations: These numbers of full time shadow economy domestic workers are a fiction, because these are calculated from the million 
hours worked in the shadow economy. Most people, who work in the shadow economy in these three countries, are “part-time” shadow economy 
workers. The calculation is only done to make comparisons to official statistics.    27 
4.2.2 OECD-Countries 
4.2.2.1 General Results 
In  Table 4.1 the estimates for the shadow economy labor force in highly developed 
OECD countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden) are 
shown.
31 In Austria the shadow economy labor force has arrived at 500.000 to 750.000 or 
16% of the official labor force (mean value) in the years 1997-1998. In Denmark the 
development of the 80s and 90s shows that the part of the Danish population engaged in 
the shadow economy ranged from 8.3% of the total labor force (in 1980) to 15.4% in 
1994 – quite a remarkable increase of the shadow economy labor force; it almost doubled 
over 15 years. In France (in the years 1997/98) the shadow economy labor force reached 
a size of between 6 and 12% of the official labor force or between 1.6 and 3.2 million in 
absolute figures. In Germany this figure rose from 8 to 12% in 1974 to 19% and to 22% 
(8 millions) in the year 1997/98. For France and Germany this is again a very strong 
increase in the shadow economy labor force. In other countries the amount of the shadow 
economy labor force is quite large, too: in Italy 30-48% (1997-1998), Spain 11.5-32% 
(1997-1998) and Sweden 19.8 % (1997-1998). In the European Union about 30 million 
people are engaged in shadow economy activities in the years 1997-1998 and in all 
European OECD countries 48 million work illicitly. These figures demonstrate that the 
shadow economy labor market is lively and may provide an explanation, why for 
example in Germany, one could observe such a high and persistent unemployment up to 
the year 2007. 
Additionally, Table 4.1 contains a preliminary calculation of the total GDP per capita 
(including the official and the shadow economy GDP per capita) in US-$. In all countries 
investigated, total GDP per capita is much higher – on average in all countries around 
40%. This clearly shows that the productivity in the shadow economy is roughly as high 
as in the official economy – a clear indication, that the work effort (i.e. the incentive to 
work effectively) is as strong in the shadow economy as in the official one. In general 
these results demonstrate that the shadow economy labor force has reached a remarkable 
                                                 
31.   Shadow economy labor force consists of estimated full-time “black” jobs, including unregistered 
workers, illegal immigrants and second “black” jobs.    28 
size in the developing countries as well as in highly developed OECD countries, even 
though the calculation still might have many errors. 
Data about the share of the shadow economy labor force in highly developed countries is 
really scarce. For three countries (compare Table 4.2), we have some data, these are 
Austria, Germany and Switzerland, where we have a shadow economy labor force 
calculated in full time shadow economy workers
32. If we consider Germany, the full time 
shadow economy workers were about 7 million in 1995 and increased to 9.4 million in 
2004 and decreased again to 8.2 million in 2009. If we consider the illegal foreign 
shadow economy full time workers in Germany, they are roughly one twelfth of the full 
time German or legal resident shadow workers. In 1995 they were 878,000, increased to 
1.2 million in 2002 and decreased again to 968,000 in 2009. In Austria, the full time 
shadow economy workers were 575,000 in 1995, increased to 798,000 in 2004 and have 
decreased since to 713,000 in 2009. Table 4.2 clearly shows that the figures of the 
shadow economy work force in these highly developed countries Austria, Germany and 
Switzerland, are much smaller than the ones in developing countries.  
4.2.2.2 Case Studies of Denmark and Germany 
Finally two case studies about the size and development of shadow economy labor 
markets in Denmark and in Germany will be presented and discussed.  
The first study is done by Hvidtfeldt, Jensen and Larsen (2011), which investigates the 
size and development of undeclared work in Denmark over the years 2008-2010, but also 
going back to the year 1994. Hvidtfeld, Jensen and Larsen (2011, p. 1) claim that more 
than half of all Danes purchase undeclared work in the course of a year. The authors got 
this finding with the help of an interview survey of 2.200 randomly-selected Danes who 
were conducted by the Rockwool Foundation Research Unit in 2010. According to their 
survey, 52% of those questioned had had undeclared work done for them in the previous 
year and had paid in cash, in kind or through return services. Their survey (2011, p. 2) 
also showed that an additional 28% would be willing to buy undeclared services, even 
                                                 
32.  These numbers of full time shadow economy workers are a “fiction”, because most people in these 
three countries are “part time” shadow economy workers. They are only calculated here to make the 
figure comparable to the work force in the official economy. Let me repeat, these full time shadow 
economy workers do not exist for Germany, Austria and Switzerland.    29 
though they had not actually done so within the previous year. In total, 80% of the Danish 
population are potential customers for undeclared work and only 20% said, they would 
refuse to pay for undeclared services.  
In table 4.3 the proportions of Danish men are shown who carried out undeclared work in 
the previous 12 month (year 2010). Table 4.3 clearly says that 48% of such undeclared 
work is done in the construction sector, followed by agriculture of 47% and motor 
vehicle sales and repairs of 43%. The least amount is done in the public and personal 
services with 26%.  
 
Table 4.3: Proportions of men who had carried out undeclared work in the previous 
12 months 
 
SECTOR in  percent 
Building and construction  48% 
Agriculture (incl. gardening), fishing and mineral extraction 47% 
Motor vehicle sales and repairs  43% 
Energy and water supply  (38%) 
Manufacturing 36% 
Transport and telecommunications 31% 
Hotel and restaurant  (30%) 
Financial and business services  28% 
Public and personal services  26% 
Retail, wholesale and repair (excluding motor vehicles)  26% 
OVERALL 32% 
Note: Figures in parentheses are based on fewer than 50 observations. 
Source: Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, 2011, p. 5. 
 
In this study the authors also investigate the amount of undeclared work since the year 
1994 and they come to the conclusion that Danes do roughly as much undeclared work 
today as they did 15 years ago. The latest figures from 2008-2010 show that every forth    30 
adult Dane carried out some kind of undeclared work in the course of a year. Those 
involved spend around three hours per week working on the undeclared labor market. 
This figure has not changed since the mid 1994. Calculations of the amount of undeclared 
work in relation to GDP also show that the situation remains largely unchanged. 
Undeclared work today is at a level of 2,8% in relation to GDP.
33  
Finally what is a quite interesting result of this study, is the acceptance of black labor 
among the Danish population.  
Table 4.4 A: Proportion of the Danish population  who find it acceptable that a 
schoolgirl should earn undeclared income for babysitting, 2007-2008. 
 
If she earns DKK 200 per week  84% 
If she earns DKK 300 per week  70% 
Source: Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, March 2011, p.14 
 
Table 4.4 B: Proportion of the Danish population who find it acceptable that a 
skilled tradesman should earn undeclared income, 2007-2008. 
 
If he earns DKK 10.000 per year  47% 
If he earns DKK 50.000 per year  27% 
Source: Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, March 2011, p. 14. 
 
The Danish population evaluates a school girl who earns some money in the shadow 
economy, and was asked about the acceptance and the same question war asked about a 
skilled tradesman. The results are reported in table 4.4. They clearly show that there is a 
high acceptance of shadow economy labor work for a school girl compared to a well 
established skilled tradesman with a reasonable high income. Not astonishing for the 
school girl the acceptance is 70% earning 300 DKK per week and 84% earning 200 DKK 
per week. For the tradesman to earn additional 10.000 DKK per year the acceptance 
                                                 
33.  In this study a lot of interesting facts are reported, like who is working, like distribution of men and  
       women in the shadow economy, like, how much is paid per hour in the different sectors, etc. Also it is  
       investigated whether high income households demand more or less shadow economy work and it 
       seems they demand more.    31 
drops down to 47% (below 50%) and if he earns more than 50.000 DKK per year the 
acceptance is only 27%. A quite interesting finding, which demonstrates that Danes 
tolerate shadow economy earnings from low income earners but not from high income 
earners. 
Also in a new study by Haigner, Jenewein, Schneider and Wakolbinger (2011) the 
informal labor supply and demand in Germany for the year 2010 is investigated. In this 
study the authors use data from a representative survey among 2104 German residents, 
conducted in May 2010. As a matter of fact, questions on illegal behavior like informal 
labor supply and demand are highly confidential and it is possible that survey 
respondents who have engaged in such activities do not want to declare that they have 
done so. In order to encourage honest answers, the interviewees have been read the 
following text (translated from German). 
“The next set of questions deals with what is called black work. We survey these 
questions on behalf of a group of independent scientists, who will process the results 
within a study. By black work they mean the following: One works for somebody and 
agrees not to pay taxes for the payment. Both partners are better off because no value 
added tax, income tax or social security contributions are paid. Such procedures are 
frequently occurring, for example, in cleaning, gardening, baby-sitting, waiting at table, 
writing or programming. Also, work which is not taxed is prevalent in construction, 
renovation, car repair and taking care of elderly people.” 
Moreover, if interviewers recognized that the interviewees hesitated to answer the 
questions on informal labor supply and demand, they would again note that the interview 
is confidential and that answers are confidential, anonymous and only for scientific use. 
The question on informal labor supply was (translated from German) “Have you, during 
the last year, worked for somebody in the way described above (black work)?” The 
question on informal labor demand was (again translated from German) “Have you, 
during the last year, demanded black work?” Moreover, they have asked informal labor 
suppliers on the reasons for doing so, on the time when they have done such works 
(working time, weekends, vacations,…), on the sector in which they have worked, on the 
number of hours they have worked per month and on the estimated hourly wage they 
have received.     32 
In order to grasp the general attitudes towards informal labor supply and demand, they 
have asked the survey respondents to declare their accordance with a set of 13 statements 
on the topic. Possible answers were indicated on a scale ranging from -4 (total 
disagreement) to +4 (total agreement). Figure 4.2 shows the results. While there seems to 
be considerable awareness of the fact that informal labor reduces the tax revenues of the 
state, many people claim, on the other hand, that high tax rates make attractive the 
informal labor market. Interestingly, many people like informal labor because it is more 
rapidly available and more flexible than official labor, which is widely perceived to be 
subject to too strict regulations. Moreover, people, on average, do not agree with the 
statement that informal labor suppliers should be reported to the police, nor would many 
people report them to the police themselves. This shows that informal labor is, in 
Germany, perceived as a rather trivial offense. 















mean value (scale from -4 to +4)
by informal labor one can easily earn extra money or save
detected informal labor suppliers should be punished by severe monetary fines
I would report an informal labor supplier to the police
I think one should report informal labor to the police
due to informal labor, the state loses billions of euros
in my neighborhood many people engage in informal labor
labor faces too strict regulations
informal labor is of less quality
informal labor increases the standard of living
the state is responsible for the high extent of informal labor: taxes are too high
informal labor is more rapidly available and flexible
without informal labor, many things would be unaffordable these days
informal labor is much cheaper than official labor
 
Source: Haigner et al. (2011) 
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(1) Informal Labor Supply 
Out of 2104 respondents, 285 (13.55%) declared that they have been supplying informal 
labor during the year before the survey. Among men, the fraction of informal labor 
suppliers was significantly higher (18.82%) than among women (8.58%) (Mann-Whitney 
U-Test, N=2104, p=0.00). Moreover, the authors find above average fractions of informal 
labor suppliers among the unemployed (29.29%) and people out of labor force “due to 
other reasons” (23.53%). Among pensioners (5.10%) and housewives and housemen 
(9.52%), the fraction is below the average, while it is close to the average among students 
(14.44%), apprentices (11.75%), self-employed persons (15.17%) and dependent 
employees (15.60%). Among persons not having completed compulsory education and 
those who have completed an apprenticeship, informal labor suppliers are 
overrepresented (24.24% and 20.41%), while they are underrepresented among persons 
with a university degree (7.19%). 
 
(2) Sectors of Informal Labour Supply 
Figure 4.3 shows in which sectors informal labor supply takes place. Not surprisingly, 
crafts and technical occupations and private household services have the highest relative 
importance. In both branches, more than a quarter of informal labor suppliers are 
engaged. About 15% of informal labor suppliers declare to be working in other services, 
gardening/agriculture and construction. Fractions do not add up to 100% since multiple 
answers have been allowed.    34 
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Source: Haigner et al.(2011) 
 
(3) Directly reported reasons 
The authors have directly asked the survey respondents (declaring to engage in informal 
labor supply) for the reasons for doing so. Again, the results are as expected. Figure 4.4 
shows that four in five declare to supply informal labor in order to earn more money. All 
other noted reasons are far less important. However, it is interesting to see, for example, 
that one in about eight informal labor suppliers do so because they do not want to lose 
transfer payments. In the German social system, pensioners as well as unemployment 
benefit and social assistance recipients face a full transfer cut and thus implicit marginal 
tax rates of 100% and more if they would officially supply labor. 
More than one in five informal labor suppliers claim that a reason for doing so is that 
others do it as well. This result is in line with our (earlier reported) finding that German 
residents perceive, in general, informal labor supply and demand as a rather trivial    35 
offence. By the same token, slightly more than ten percent of informal labor suppliers 
claim that they do so because their customers want the demanded work to be done 
unofficially. Another ten percent say that they like the flexibility of informal labor 
supply. 
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fraction of answers (multiple answers allowed)
other reasons
customers want unofficial work
work officially not allowed
I like the work
is more flexible
don't want to lose transfer
others do it as well
to earn more money
 
Source: Haigner et al. (2011) 
 
4.2.3 Developing Countries – Earlier Results
34 
Table 4.5 shows the results of countries in Africa. Gambia has the largest shadow 
economy labor force with 80% of the official one, followed by Guinea with 79%, Benin 
with 76.9%, Rwanda with 75%, and the Republic of Congo with 50%.
35 Zimbabwe has 
                                                 
34. This parts follows closely Schneider and Enste (2002, part 5, pp. 43-51). 
35. These high values strongly indicate that a considerable number of these illicit workers also have (at  
    least part-time) jobs in the official economy. Yet, the number of these ‘double-job-holders’ (official and     36 
the lowest rate of illicit work with 33.9% of the official labor force. For African 
countries, the figures show considerable variation and should really be seen as first and 
preliminary results. Under the assumption that this informal or shadow economy labor 
force is as productive as the official economy and contributes per capita a similar added 
value, the shadow economy GNP can be calculated, which is also shown in Table 4.4. 
Gambia has the largest shadow economy as a percentage of official GNP with 41.2%, 
followed by Guinea with 36.9%, and Rwanda with 38.7%. On average, the supply of 
illicit work in these 33 African countries is 54.2% (of the official labor force) and 24.6% 
of the population. 
Table 4.6 illustrates the results for some Asian countries. Here, China, India, and 
Indonesia have to be examined more closely, as they are the three largest countries in 
Asia (regarding population). In China, it is estimated that 160 million people work in the 
shadow economy – 21.9% of the official labor force.
36 In India, 217 million people work 
illicitly – 50% of the official labor force. In Indonesia, 36.7 million people engage in 
shadow economic activities, this corresponds to 37.4% of the official labor force. In 
Pakistan, 29.4 million people or 60% work in the shadow economy. One realizes that in 
Asia the shadow economy labor force is quite high, a result also found in the OECD 
(2009) study. On the whole, the shadow economy labor force in these Asian countries 
makes up 46.5% of the official labor force and 19.6% of the population. 
In Table 4.7 some Latin and South American states are shown. In absolute terms, Brazil 
has the highest shadow economy labor force with 37.4 million (49.2% of the official 
labor force), followed by Colombia with 9.7 million or 53.8%. Both Ecuador with 58.8%, 
and Peru with 54.6%, have a quite high rate of illicit work. Chile has the lowest rate, with 
40%, as well as Paraguay with 41%, and El Salvador with 47.3% of the official labor 
                                                                                                                                                 
     unofficial at the same time) is unknown and may differ from country to country. The ratio of the shadow 
     economy labour force as a percentage of the official one should be interpreted very cautiously, since 
     it is unclear what this ratio actually stands for. Hence, an interpretation is very difficult. In addition,  
     making comparisons between different countries is very complicated and such comparisons provide  
     only  a very crude picture. Maybe the rate of the shadow economy labour force as a percentage of the  
     population   is a somewhat better gauge. 
36. The figure for China should be interpreted with great care as this country still has a communist regime 
      with some regions under a capitalist system.    37 
force. Overall, the shadow economy labor force in these nine countries is 49.6% of the 
official labor force and 20.3% of the population. 
4.2.4 Transition Countries – Earlier Results 
Nine transition countries were analyzed (see Table 4.8.). Armenia has the highest rate 
with an illicit labor force of 75.5% of the official labor force, followed by Croatia with 
70%, and Bulgaria with 63%. In absolute figures, Russia has by far the largest shadow 
economy labor force among the transition countries with 32.9 million illegal workers, 
followed by Rumania with 4.7 million, and Kazakhstan with 2.8 million. Slovenia has the 
lowest black labor force with 31%.
37 Generally, the shadow economy labor force in these 
nine countries is 49% of the official labor force and 23.9% of the population. Here the 
findings should be interpreted with great care, as these “transition” countries switched 
from a planned economy to a market economy and due to this official statistics had a lot 
of preliminary figures and calculation methods were difficult to use.
                                                 
37 Of the official labor force.    38 
Table 4.5: Shadow economy labor force in Africa 
  Informal employment (1998)  Labor force (1997) 
Country Millions 
As % of official 
labor force 




millions  Millions 












GNP as % of 
official GNP 
Angola 1.90  35.7  16.3  11.66  5.3  45.45  646  4,000  16.2 
Benin 2.00  76.9  34.5  5.80  2.6  44.83  758  2,200  34.5 
Botswana 0.30  45.0  19.6  1.53  0.7  45.75  1,080  5,600  19.3 
Burkina Faso  3.40  65.0  32.5  10.47  5.2  49.67  816  2,600  31.4 
Cameroon 3.50  61.7  25.1  13.94  5.7 40.89  2,135  8,700  24.5 
Chad 1.30  38.0  18.2  7.15  3.4  47.55  299  —  — 
Congo 0.60  50.3  22.1  2.71  1.1  40.59  414  1,900  21.8 
Côte d’lvoire  3.40  60.3  23.9  14.21  5.7  40.11  2,380  10,100  23.6 
Dem. Rep. of 
Congo 
15.70 80.0 33.6  46.71  19.6  41.96  1,727  5,400 32.0 
Ethiopia 15.70  61.0 26.3  59.75  25.7  43.01  1,570  6,200  25.3 
Gabon 0.30  58.0  26.1  1.15  0.5  43.48  1,251  — — 
Gambia 0.50 80.0  42.4  1.18  0.6  50.85  170  413  41.2 
Ghana 6.10  72.3  33.9  17.98  8.5  47.27  2,379  7,200  33.0 
Guinea 2.60  79.0  37.6  6.92  3.3  47.69  1,404  3,800  36.9 
Kenya 6.00  40.8  21.0  28.61  14.6  51.03  2,100  9,800  21.4 
Lesotho 0.31 38.8  15.4  2.01  0.8  39.80  185  1,200  15.4 
Liberia 0.40  35.0  13.8  2.89  1.2  41.52  —  — —    39 
Table 4.5: Shadow economy labor force in Africa – cont. 
  Informal employment (1998)  Labor force (1997) 
Country Millions 
As % of official 
labor force 




millions  Millions 












GNP as % of 
official GNP 
Madagascar 3.90  57.5  27.6  14.15  6.7  47.35  1,014  3,700  27.4 
Malawi 2.50  51.7  24.3  10.28  4.9  47.67  500  2,100  23.8 
Mali 1.80  36.0  17.5  10.29  5.0  48.59  450  2,600  17.3 
Mauritania 0.50  41.0  20.3  2.46  1.1  44.72  205  1,000  20.5 
Namibia 0.33  47.1 20.4  1.62  0.7  43.21  652  3,200 20.4 
Niger 2.30  51.0  23.5  9.80  4.6  46.94  437  —  — 
Nigeria 23.40 48.9  19.8  117.90  47.9  40.63  17,780  36,400  48.8 
Rwanda 3.20 75.0  40.5  7.90  4.2  53.16  736  1,900 38.7 
Senegal 2.50 62.4  28.4  8.79  4.0  45.51  1,325  4,800  27.6 
Sierra Leone  1.30  70.0  27.4  4.75  1.8  37.89  182  702  25.9 
Sudan 4.60  42.6  16.3  28.30  10.8  38.16  1,333  8,200  16.3 
Tanzania 6.80  42.2 21.7  31.32  16.1  51.40  1,476  6,800  21.7 
Togo 0.70  38.9  16.1  4.34  1.8  41.47  226  1,400  16.1 
Tunisia 2.00 57.1  21.5  9.30  3.5  37.63  4,272  19,400  21.5 
Uganda 5.80 56.4  28.5  20.32  10.2  50.20  1,798  —  — 
Zimbabwe 1.80  33.9  15.7  11.47  5.3 46.21  1,082  6,900  15.7 
Average over 33 
countries 
3.9 54.2  24.6      44.9      25.7    40 
Source: Schneider and Enste (2002, chapter 5), based on World Bank, Africa Region Live Database, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/regions.htm. 
Table 4.6:  Shadow economy labor force in Asia 
















in billion $, 
1998 
Informal 
GNP as % 
of official 
GNP 
China  162.40 21.9  13.1  1,238.60  743.0 59.99  138,327  1,055,000 13.1 
India 217.20  50.4  22.2  979.70  431.0  43.99  95,568  427,400  22.4 
Indonesia 36.70  37.4  18.0 203.70 98.0  48.11  24,956 221,500  11.3 
Mongolia 0.42  44.0  16.2 2.60  1.0  38.46 169  1,000  16.9 
Nepal 8.60  78.1  37.6  22.90  11.0  48.03  1,803  4,800  37.6 
Pakistan 29.40  60.0  22.3  131.60  49.0  37.23  —  —  — 
Philippines 9.80  30.6  13.0  75.20  32.0  42.55 11,520  88,400  13.1 
Sri Lanka  2.50  31.3  13.3  18.80  8.0  42.55  —  —  — 
Yemen 3.30  65.0  19.9  16.60  5.0  30.12  990  4,400 22.5 
Average of 9 
countries 
52.3 46.5 19.5      43.4     19.5 
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/regions.htm. 
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Table 4.7:  Shadow economy labor force in Latin and South America 
  Informal employment (1998)  Labor force (1998) 
Country Millions 
As % of labor
force 












in billion $, 
1998 
Informal 
GNP as % of 
official GNP
Bolivia  1.54  51.3  19.5 7.90  3.0  37.97  1,540 7,400  20.8 
Brazil 37.40 49.2 22.5  165.90  76.0  45.81  — —  — 
Chile 2.40  40.0  16.2  14.80  6.0  40.54  11,54
4 
73,400 15.7 
Colombia 9.70  53.8  23.8 40.80 18.0  44.12  25,22
0 
106,100 23.8 
Ecuador  2.94  58.8  24.1 12.20  5.0  40.98  4,482 18,600  24.1 
El Salvador  1.40  47.3  23.0  6.10  3.0  49.18  2,590  11,200  23.1 
Guatemala  2.01  50.3  18.6 10.80  4.0  37.04  3,296 16,800  19.6 
Paraguay 0.80  41.0  15.4 5.20  2.0  38.46  1,408 9,200  15.3 
Peru 4.91  54.6  19.8  24.80  9.0  36.29  12,07
9 
61,100 19.8 
Average of 9 
countries 
7.0 49.6  20.3    41.2      20.3 
Source: Schneider and Enste (2002, chapter 5) based on World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/regions.htm. 
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Table 4.8:  Shadow economy labor force in transition countries 

















in billion $, 
1998 
Informal 
GNP as % 
of official 
GNP 
Armenia 1.51  75.5  39.7  3.80  2.0  52.63  725  1,800  40.3 
Bulgaria 2.52  63.0  30.4  8.30  4.0  48.19  3,100  10,100  30.7 
Croatia 1.40  70.0  31.1  4.50  2.0  44.44  6,328  20,700  30.6 
Georgia  1.10  36.7  20.4  5.40  3.0  55.56  1,023 5,100 20.1 
Kazakhstan 2.80  40.0  17.9 15.60  7.0  44.87  3,668  19,400  18.9 
Kyrgyzstan 0.80  40.0  17.0  4.70  2.0  42.55  280  1,600  17.5 
Rumania 4.70  42.7  20.9  22.50  11.0  48.89  6,533  31,300  20.9 
Russian 
Federation 
32.90 42.2  22.4  146.90 78.0  53.10  75,670  337,900  22.4 
Slovenia 0.31  31.0  15.5  2.00  1.0  50.00  3,026  19,400  15.6 
Average of 9 
countries 
5.3 49.0  23.9     48.9     24.1 
Source: Schneider and Enste (2002, Chapter 5) based on World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/regions.htm 
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4.2.5 Developing and Transition Countries – Latest Results 
Compared to the first estimates presented in the subchapters 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 there have been 
some newer studies with respect to estimate the size and development of the shadow economy 
labour force
38. Kucera and Roncolato (2008, p.321) deal with informal employment. They 
address issues of crucial importance to labour market policy; first, the intensive labour market 
regulation is one major cause of informal employment, and second, the so called voluntary 
informal employment. Kucera and Roncolato give a theoretical overview on both issues and 
also a survey of a number of empirical studies, in which the effect of the official labour 
market regulations on informal employment is analyzed, where they find a significant and 
quantitatively important influence. 
 
In Table 4.9 the share of informal employment in total non-agricultural employment by five-
year period and by country and region is presented. From the table one clearly sees that in all 
countries the share of informal employment has remarkably increased over time. The share of 
informal employment in Algeria in the period of 1975-1979 was 21.8% and increased in the 
period of 2000-2007 to 41.3%. In India informal employment rose in the period of 1985-1989 
from 76.2% to 83.4% from 1995-1999. In the Republic of Mali the share of informal 
employment (in percent of total non agricultural employment) was 63.1% from 1975-1979, 
and increased to 81.8% in 2000-2007. Table 5.5 clearly demonstrates that there is a very 
strong positive trend in the share of informal employment (in percent of total non agricultural 
employment). 
 
Table 4.10 provides the share of informal employment in total non-agricultural employment 
by country, region and gender. If one splits up the share of informal employment (in percent 
of total non agricultural employment) by gender, we generally observe, that the share of 
women is significantly higher than the share of men. In North Africa (countries Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt) the share of informal employment of women is 43.3% and the one 
of men 49.3% over the period 1990-1999. In Sub-Saharan Africa the share of women is 
84.1%, the one of men 63.0%. In Latin America the share of women is 56.2% and the share of 
men 47.1%. Only in the region of West Asia and in the transition countries the share of men 
of informal employment is higher than the one of women. In West Asia (countries Lebanon, 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, Syria, Turkey, Yemen) the share of women is 31.1%, the share of 
men 43.4%. In the Transition countries (Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia) the share of women is 
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22.3% and the share of men 27.2%. We also see here some remarkable differences. In general 
the share of informal employment is rather large worldwide and certainly has severe policy 
implications.  
 
4.3 Further Indicators of the Shadow Labor Force 
In this part some further indicators of the shadow economy labor force are discussed, as there 
are no exact measures of the shadow economy labor force, all measures which serve as 
proxies are shown. 
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Table 4.9: Share of Informal Employment in Total Non-Agricultural Employment by five-
year period and by country and region (in percent) 
 
     Periode     
Region  1975-79  1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-07 
North Africa          47.5  47.3 
Algeria  21.8    25.6   42.7 41.3 
Morocco    56.9    44.8  67.1 
Tunesia  38.4  35.0 39.3   47.1 35.0 
Egypt  58.7    37.3   55.2 45.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa        76.0     
Benin      92.9    
Burkina  Faso      70.0 77.0    
Chad        74.2 95.2  
Guinea    64.4   71.9 86.7  
Kenya      61.4 70.1 71.6  
Mali  63.1    78.6 90.4 94.1 81.8 
Mauritania    69.4  80.0     
Mozambique      73.5    
N i g e r   6 2 . 9        
Senegal    76.0      
South  Africa        50.6 
Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of Congo) 
  5 9 . 6       
Zambia      58.3    
Latin America          54.2   
Argentina        47.5 53.3  
Bolivia        56.9 63.5  
Brazil        60.0 60.0 51.1 
Chile       35.8   
Colombia       38.4   
Costa  Rica       44.3   
Dominican  Republic       47.6   
Ecuador       53.5  74.9 
El  Salvador       56.6   
Guatemala      56.1    
Haiti       92.6   
Honduras       58.2   
Mexico        55.5 59.4 50.1 
Panama       37.6  49.4 
Paraguay       65.5   
P e r u         6 7 . 9  
Venezuela        38.8 46.9 49.4 
South and Southeast Asia          69.9   
India      76.2 73.7 83.4  
Indonesia      39.2   77.9  
Pakistan      39.0   64.6  
Philippines        70.5 72.0  
Thailand      57.4 51.4 51.5     46 
Table 4.9: Share of Informal Employment in Total Non-Agricultural Employment by five-
year period and by country and region (in percent) – cont. 
Region     Periode     
 
 
1975-79  1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-07 
West Asia            43.2 
Iran     43.5    48.8 
Lebanon        51.8 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip        43.4 
Syria        41.7 42.9 30.7 
Turkey       30.9  33.2 
Yemen      57.1   51.1 
Transition countries            24.1 
K y r g y z s t a n         4 4 . 4  
Moldova        21.5 
Romania       5.4  22.0 
Russia        8.6 
Sources: OECD 2009, pages 34-35; and Charmes (2002, 2007, 2008) for the ILO Women and Men in the 
Informal Economy, 2002. For the most recent period: Heintz and Chang (2007) for the ILO, and for West Asia: 
Charmes (2007 and 2008). For detailed sources, see annex 2 A4. Stat.Link 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/533451351643 
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Table 4.10:  Share of Informal Employment in Total Non-Agricultural Employment, by 
                   country, region and gender (in percent), 1190s and 2000s 
Region  1990 - 1999    2000-2007   
  Women  Men  Women  Men 
North Africa  43.3  49.3     
Algeria 40.6  43.1     
Morocco 46.8  44.0     
Tunesia 39.2  53.2     
Egypt  46.5  56.9 38.6 47.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa  84.1  63.0  77.1  62.6 
Benin 97.3  87.0     
Chad 95.2  59.5     
Guinea 86.7  65.6     
Kenya 83.1  59.1     
Mali     89.2  74.2 
South  Africa  58.4  43.6 64.9 51.0 
Latin America  56.2  47.1  59.5  55.4 
Bolivia 74.4  55.0     
Brazil  67.3  54.7 52.3 50.2 
Chile 43.9  30.9     
Colombia 44.0  34.1     
Costa Rica  48.0  42.1     
Dominican Republic  49.7  46.5     
Ecuador     76.9  73.2 
El Salvador  68.6  45.7     
Guatemala 69.4  46.5     
Honduras 65.5  73.6     
Mexico  55.0  54.3 53.5 47.8 
Panama  40.8  35.5 50.4 48.7 
Peru     72.0  65.1 
Venezuela  47.3  46.7 52.1 47.5 
South and Southeast Asia  72.7  70.2     
India 85.7  82.9     
Indonesia 77.2  78.0     
Philippines 73.4  70.8     
Thailand 54.3  49.1     
West Asia  31.1  43.4  35.4  44.4 
Lebanon     60.0  44.4 
West Bank and Gaza Strip      20.2  46.8 
Syria 34.6  42.8     
Turkey  19.1  29.1 32.2 33.4 
Yemen  39.7  58.2 29.3 52.8 
Transition countries      22.3  27.2 
Kyrgyzstan     40.9  47.1 
Moldova     18.4  28.0 
Russia     7.6  9.6 
Source: OECD 2009, page 47; and Charmes (2002), for the ILO Women and Men in the Informal Economy, 
2002. For the most recent period: Heintz and Chang (2007) for the ILO, and for West Asia: 
 
4.3.1 The Share of Self-Employed in total Employment 
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Figure 4.5: Share of self employed in total employment (average: from 1995 to 2008 or the  












































Source: OECD, STAN database, 2010, Paris. 
 
The share of self employment in total employment can be seen as one indicator of the shadow 
economy labor force. If we consider Figure 4.5 we clearly see, that Greece, Korea, Poland, 
Italy, Portugal have the highest share of self employed (in percent of total employed) with a 
value of 48 % for Greece, a value of 26 % and 25 % for Poland and Italy respectively. As 
these values are highly correlated with the size of the shadow economy it is quite obvious that 
at least a great part of this self employed work in the shadow economy, (too). 
 
4.3.2 The Share of Employees not covered by Social Security Contributions 
In Table 4.11 the share of employees without social security contributions are shown for some 
European countries. If we compare the single countries in Table 4.11 we clearly see that there 
are vast differences between the listed countries where in some the share of employees 
without any social security advantage is pretty high. The leader is Poland with a value 
between 65 and 57 % in the years 2007 and 2008, followed by France with 51,9 % and then 
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size of the shadow economy labor force, as it is quite plausible that at least some of these 
work in the shadow economy. 
Table 4.11: Share of employees not covered by social security contributions 
 
Share of non-insured 
employees in   
 Country  2007  2008 
        
Austria 35,4  34,5 
Belgium 38,8  36,2 
Czech Republic  40,8  40,4 
Estonia 34,6  33,9 
Finland 23,0  23,5 
France 51,9  -- 
Greece 37,1  37,3 
Hungary 40,6  42,4 
Iceland 13,4  13,3 
Ireland 39,8  40,3 
Italy 40,0  39,3 
Luxembourg 34,6  32,6 
Netherlands 17,7  21,6 
Norway 12,2  13,2 
Poland 65,3  57,0 
Portugal 35,1  38,5 
Slovak Republic  39,1  38,5 
Slovenia 24,7  25,2 
Spain 41,5  41,4 
Sweden 22,7  22,0 
Source: OECD calculation based on EU-SILC 2007 and 2008. 
 
4.3.3 The Share of Workers without an Employment Contract 
In Figure 4.6 the share of workers without an employment contract is shown for various 
European countries. The leading country is Turkey with 44 %, followed by Ireland 39 % and 
Greece 39 %, then Israel 38 %. The lowest countries are Sweden and Finland with only 2 or 1 
% share of workers without an employment contract. 
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Source. European Social Survey (ESS), 2008. 
 
4.3.4 Summary of the Measures of Informal Employment 
In an OECD study (OECD 2008) OECD focused on informal employment in seven OECD 
countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland and the Slovak Republic and 
Turkey. Table 4.12 which is taken from this OECD study, nicely shows the alternative 
measures of informal employment and undeclared work. It is grouped in employees in 
informal job and own account workers, unpaid family workers, multiple job holders with 
undeclared income. The highest values for almost all of these seven categories has Mexico, 
followed by Turkey and then by Korea. Table 4.12 clearly shows, how difficult the informal 
or shadow economy labor force measurement is and how difficult the problems are. In all 
categories there might be some shadow economy labor work, but it is very difficult to 
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Table 4.12: Alternative measures of informal employment and undeclared work, Year 2006. 

















































  % of non-farm 
employment
1 
        




-- 1,8  11,4  0,7  2,1  10,1  3,0 
Hungary 
 
19,4 2,6  6,4  0,3  1,8 8,6  8,0 
Korea 
 
25,8 --  17,1  4,7  1,7 7,0  -- 
Mexico 
 
31,5 26,9  20,6  5,1  3,3 30,9  -- 
Poland 
 




-- 2,2 9,2  0,1  1,2  5,6 7,0 
Turkey 21,7  --  16,6  3,3  3,1  24,6  -- 
Source: OECD (2008), Paris. 
 
4.3.5 Shadow Economy Workers with Illegal Immigrant Background 
In a number of European countries one has figures about shadow economy workers coming 
from illegal immigrants. A first estimate has been undertaken again by OECD (2011) and are 
shown in Figure 4.7. Considering these figures one realizes that the size again is increased 
with 4,4 % of total employment the highest in Greece, followed by the United States with 
3,15 %, by Italy 2 % and at the lowest end are Norway and Sweden with 0,5 % or 0,4 % of 
total employment. This table “confirms” the values of a similar size in table 4.2 for Germany, 
Switzerland and Austria. Both tables clearly show that illegal immigrant employment takes 
place, but from the size perspective it is rather small for most countries. 
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 1   The estimates of the number of employed illegal immigrants are calculated using the number of 
irregular migrants and assuming the same employment rate for illegal immigrants as for legal migrants. 
Source: OECD Calculations based on OECD International Migration Outlook (2009) and OECD 
Economic Outlook Database (2010). 
 
5.  SHADOW ECONOMY AND UNEMPLOYMENT
39 
 
Although there has been some discussion on the size of the shadow economy labor force and 
on its reasons, comparatively little attention has been given to the relationship between 
unemployment and working in the shadow economy. As Tanzi (1999) points out, “the current 
literature does not cast much light on these relationships even though the existence of large 
underground activities would imply that one should look more deeply at what is happening in 
the labor market” (p. 347). The objective of the paper by Bajada and Schneider (2009) is to 
examine the extent of participation in the shadow economy by the unemployed. Their paper 
has investigated the relationship between the unemployment rate and the shadow economy. 
                                                 
39. This part is taken from Feld and Schneider (2010).    53 
Previous literature on this topic has suggested that the relationship between these two 
variables is ambiguous, predominantly because a heterogeneous group of people working in 
the shadow economy exists and there are also various cyclical forces at work, such that they 
produce a net effect that is weakly correlated with unemployment. In their paper they have 
provided a suggestion for disentangling these cyclical effects, so as to study the component of 
the shadow economy that is influenced directly by those who are unemployed. They refer to 
this effect as the ‘substitution effect’ which typically increases during declining periods of 
legitimate economic activity (and increasing unemployment). Equipped with this approach for 
measuring the ‘substitution effect’, they discover that a relationship exists between changes in 
the unemployment rate and shadow economy activity.  
By examining the growth cycle characteristics of the ‘substitution effect’ component of the 
shadow economy Bajada and Schneider (2009) determine that the growth cycles are 
symmetric (in terms of steepness and deepness) and that changes in the unemployment rate, 
whether positive or negative, had similar impacts on changes in the substitution effect 
component. They suggest that the shadow economy is a source of financial support during 
periods of unemployment for those genuinely wanting to participate in the legitimate 
economy. Although this does not exclude the possibility that long-term unemployed may also 
be participating in the shadow economy, it would appear that short-term fluctuations in 
unemployment directly contribute to short-term fluctuations in the shadow economy.  
When Bajada and Schneider consider the various unemployment support programs across 12 
OECD countries, there appears to be no real systematic relationship between the generosity of 
the social security systems and the nature of short-term shadow economic activity by the 
unemployed. Even the various replacement rates across the OECD countries appear to have 
little consequence on the rate at which the unemployed take on and cut back shadow economy 
activity. There is however some evidence to suggest that extended duration spell in 
unemployment lasts anywhere between less than 3 months to approximately 9 months.  
On the whole Bajada and Schneider argue that dealing with unemployment participation in 
the shadow economy as a way of correcting the inequity it generates, is best handled by more 
stringent monitoring of those receiving unemployment benefits rather than reducing 
replacement rates as a way of encouraging re-integration into the work force. A strategy of 
reducing replacement rates would not only fail to maintain adequate support for those 
experiencing financial hardship during periods of unemployment, it is likely to have little    54 
impact on reducing participation by the unemployed who are willing and able to engage in 
shadow economy activity. 
6.  ADJUSTMENTS OF SHADOW ECONOMY MEASURES (VALUE 
ADDED) IN NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 
Due to the strong increase of the size and development of the shadow economy (in value 
added terms) a number of countries have undertaken adjustments of this non observed 
economy measures in their national accounts
40. OECD (2011, p.14) has detected seven 
adjustment activities, which are included in some countries in their national accounts. 
A1: A producer deliberately does not register to avoid tax and social security obligations.  
A2: A producer deliberately does not register as a legal identity or as entrepreneur because he 
is involved in illegal activities.  
A3: A producer is not required to register because he has no market output. 
A4: A legal person not surveyed due to reasons such as business register is out of date or 
updating procedures are inequate.  
A5: Registered entrepreneurs may not be surveyed due to the statistical office does not 
conduct a survey of registered entrepreneurs.  
A6: Cross output is underreported and/or intermediate consumption is overstated.  
A7: Data is either not complete or not collected or not directly collectable and/or data are 
incorrectly handled. 
If one considers those countries, which do some adjustment, one amazing thing is, that big 
adjustment takes place in Italy between 14,8 and 16,7 % and in Poland between 7,8 and 15,7 
%. The largest adjustment is taking place in Russia with 24,3 % and the smallest one in the 
United States with 0,8 %. Table 6.1 clearly shows that those countries, which do some 
adjustment, their adjustment is vastly different compared to other countries. Hence, this leads 
to the problem, that for these countries starting from Australia and ending with the United 
States the measures of the size and development of the shadow economy in percent of official 
GDP is biased, because a part of the shadow economy has been already considered. This is 
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certainly a further difficulty when comparing the size and development of shadow economies 
between countries.    56 
Table 6.1: Adjustment of non-observed economy in National Accounts, around 2000 
                                             Activities included 
  Size of non-observed 




























Australia  1,3      X      X  X 
Austria 7,9  X   X  X  X  X  X 
Belgium  3,0-4,0  X    X      X  X 
Canada Not  stated  X X  X      X  X 
Czech Rep.  4,6(E); 6,6 (I); 9,3 
(O) 
X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Estonia 9,6  X X        X  X 
Finland  Not stated  X    X      X   
Germany Not  stated             
Hungary  11,9  X  X  X      X  X 
Ireland 4,0     X  X    X  X 
Italy  14,8(L); 16,7(U)  X    X  X  X  X   
Mexico 12,1   X  X         
Netherlands  1,0            X  X 
Norway 2,4(O);1(E)     X  X  X  X  X 
Poland  15,7(O);7,8(E)  X  X  X      X  X 
Russia 24,3  X   X  X  X  X  X 
Spain  11,2  X      X    X  X 
Sweden 1,3   X        X  X 
Turkey  1,66  X    X      X   
UK Not  stated  X   X   X  X  X 
US  0,8            X   
O=according to output approach; E-according to expenditure approach; I=according to income approach; L=Lower bound; U=Upper bound; Source: United Nations, UN, 
2008.   57 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
In my paper some of the most recent developments in research on the shadow economy and 
undeclared work in highly developed OECD, developing and transition countries are shown. 
Besides the figures of the illicit work force in the rural and non-rural sector some other 
measures of the shadow economy labor force, like unpaid family workers, own account 
workers, multiple job holders, etc. are presented. The studies based on the MIMIC approach 
also report strong effects of tax morale, but underline the higher importance of tax policies 
and state regulation to increase the shadow economy.  
The discussion of the recent literature shows that economic opportunities for employees, the 
overall situation on the labor market, not least unemployment are crucial for an understanding 
of the dynamics of the shadow economy. Individuals look for ways to improve their economic 
situation and thus contribute productively to aggregate income of a country. This holds 
regardless of their being active in the official or the unofficial economy.  
If I come back to the headline of my paper “The shadow economy and shadow economy labor 
force: What do we (not) know?”, I clearly realize that one has some knowledge about the size 
and development of the shadow economy and the size and development of the shadow 
economy labor force. For developing countries, the shadow economy labor force has reached 
a remarkable size according to OECD (2009) estimates, which is that in most developing 
countries the shadow economy labor force is higher than the official labor force. What we do 
not know are the exact motives that people work in the shadow economy and what is their 
relation and feeling if a government undertakes reforms in order to bring them back into the 
official economy. Hence, much more micro studies are needed to obtain a more detailed 
knowledge about people’s motivation to work either the shadow economy and/or in the 
official one.     58 
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